BALANCING SECURITY AND OPENNESS

A Thematic Summary of a Symposium on Security and the Design of Public Buildings

“Architecture is inescapably a political art, and it reports faithfully for ages to come what the political values of a particular age were. Surely ours must be openness and fearlessness in the face of those who hide in the darkness. Precaution. Yes. Sequester. No.”

—Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
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Ronald Reagan Building and
International Trade Center
Washington, DC
With the words noted above, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan welcomed those who had gathered to celebrate the biennial General Services Administration Design Awards at the March 1999 ceremony in Washington, DC. Senator Moynihan devoted his keynote address to a discussion of the effects of terrorism on the character of America’s public buildings. He called for a national conversation on the balance between security and design in public buildings.

The comments presented in the following pages represent the first stage of this dialogue. They summarize themes presented at the “Balancing Security and Openness” symposium convened on November 30, 1999, jointly sponsored by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) and the U.S. Department of State in cooperation with The American Institute of Architects. Highlights of the symposium included a reprise appearance by Senator Moynihan whose opening remarks stressed the importance of maintaining a “civic culture.” He proclaimed, “We have nothing to promote if we become a fortress society....The only triumph of terrorism is if we become terrified.” Rallying attendees to think optimistically and creatively, he concluded, “We are not a terrified society. We will prevail.”

At a luncheon address, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer amplified this theme by urging that the symposium discussion emphasize values-democracy and hope, dignity and permanence-and the expression of these and similar American ideals in architecture. He stated that discovering answers to appropriately balancing security and openness would take time, that it was a complex challenge with numerous “countervailing considerations” difficult to address in a bureaucratic framework. He urged patience and dedication to an effort that, paralleling the debate in Supreme Court cases, would bring all affected parties into

“Openness in Federal architecture is a symbol of inestimable value. Our government is not distant. It is a government of the people. And our public buildings must say they are about people and our democratic values.”

—Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer
dialogue. Like Senator Moynihan, he was optimistic that such an exchange would lead to solutions—solutions that would provide needed security and, at the same time, reflect the "overwhelming and overarching need for openness" in our public buildings. Justice Breyer emphasized this last point by closing his remarks with a statement that were he to err in this discussion, "it would be on the side of openness."

Other speakers at the symposium addressed a range of topics. There was an overview of the realities of terrorist threats both in the U.S. and at U.S. government facilities abroad, and commentary on perceptions related to those threats. Ambassadors and staff working at embassies shared personal insights on security. Several architects and landscape architects described their attitudes and approaches. There was a discussion of security case studies and specific design strategies. Policymakers offered critiques of the dilemmas presented by the mandate for increased security. And, at the conclusion of the day, senior officials from the Department of State and GSA summarized key issues and responses to the exchange that had taken place. (See the last section of this report for a list of symposium presenters.)

The dialogue left participants more informed and sensitive to security and design issues. It also moved forward a commitment on the part of Federal agencies and design professionals to work together to balance security and openness with a wisdom borne of accurate data rather than on prescriptive, one-size-fits-all solutions. Fulfilling Senator Moynihan’s vision, the symposium had indeed started a conversation, one where the expression of fundamental American values and our concern for public safety would both be at the heart of how our public architecture responds to the challenges of terrorism in the United States and around the globe.

Finally, it is necessary to say a few words about the organization of this report. In a complex discussion, comments inevitably move back and forth among issues. The text in this document is intended to elaborate important themes. These are not minutes of a meeting but rather a compilation of various points of view related to specific subjects. Ideas rather than attributions are the focus of the effort, highlighted from time to time with individual perspectives. Within this framework, themes are divided into three categories:

- Facts and Background Information
- Addressing the Security Challenge—General Perspectives and Strategies
- Examples and Case Studies—Creative Responses to the Mandate for Security
Two presenters at the symposium—Jim Rice, head of the Domestic Terrorism Program, National Capital Response Squad, at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and David Carpenter, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security for the U.S. Department of State—made it clear that terrorism is a real threat to Americans at home and abroad. Rice noted that while the acts of terrorism are down, injuries from such incidents are up. Handguns, pipe bombs, package bombs, and fires intentionally set are the most common terrorist tools. In addition to the violence initiated by left-wing organizations, right-wing extremists are increasingly active in terrorist activities, and less is known about these radical conservatives. Overall, terrorist groups are more diverse and fragmented than in the past, and a growing number encourage people to act individually. Good intelligence is the best protection but surveillance, physical barriers, and detection technologies are still necessary and effective countermeasures. Decision-makers should be aware of the range of threats—from the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to the more mundane but easily available supply of guns and homemade bombs. They should devise contingency plans for both the most likely and plausible scenarios and the worst case scenarios.

Carpenter discussed the security challenges of protecting U.S. embassies, which are high-profile targets for anti-American groups. There have been thousands of threats to these facilities, and in 1998 alone the Diplomatic Security surveillance detection program revealed more than 400 cases of suspicious surveillance of embassy buildings. Many of the buildings are over 40 years old, and almost 90 percent do not meet current security standards. Carpenter believes the dangers associated with terrorism are greater today than in years past because terrorists are sponsored by an increasing number of foreign governments, not just a few.

“Terrorism Is a Real Threat

“Our embassies should express the values of the United States. We want effective security, and we want openness. And we invite the help of the design community in realizing this balance.”

—David Carpenter,
Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security,
US Department of State

“We must remain an open society. We must cherish this ideal. We also have to be aware of what’s out there and prevent terrorism from compromising this ideal.”

—Jim Rice,
Domestic Terrorism Program,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The threat is both transnational and global. America is confronting individuals and organizations that have the financing, training, motivation, equipment, and materials to strike at U.S. interests anywhere in the world. The methods of attack vary from assassinations to truck bombs and could include weapons of mass destruction. And, while the network of international terrorist leader Usama bin Ladin is well financed, many other terrorist groups are discovering that they can carry out missions with modest funds, minimal organization, cheap information, and easily accessible weaponry. Whereas symbolism and convenience were once the high priorities in embassy design, security and safety have now moved to the top.

The Honorable Barbara Bodine, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen, personalized the dangers of State Department service by noting that, since the end of the Vietnam War, more American diplomatic employees have been killed in the line of duty than American soldiers in combat. Still, many speakers from the diplomatic service joined Senator Moynihan in cautioning against over-reacting to the terrorist threat. All acknowledged terrorism as a past and current reality, but the consensus was clearly not to compromise fundamental American values in responding to this threat.

“Randomness and lack of warning are the attributes of human violence we fear most, but you know that human violence is rarely random and rarely without warning.”

—Gavin de Becker, from The Gift of Fear
A highlight of the symposium was a presentation by award-winning author and security expert Gavin de Becker, who shared his insights on the distinction between anxiety and actual risk. Warranted fear, according to de Becker, is the response to an actual threat. It is a good thing and essential to survival because it leads to vigilance and wise precautions. Unwarranted fear is fear created by imagination. The media plays up unwarranted fear with sensational, graphic reports about catastrophic dangers and personal violence that do not represent a statistically accurate picture of risks in everyday life. These stories lead to worry and reduce the quality of our lives as unwarranted fear becomes the dictator of what we do and how we spend our resources. A person is 20 times more to be shot in downtown Detroit than while visiting the Pyramids; yet, we cancel once-in-a-lifetime holidays because of a perceived risk after one violent incident against foreigners there. We forgo a life-saving vaccine because of the side effects it has on a handful of people. According to de Becker, the actions of ten dangerous men have been the causes for most of our airport security, sealed food and medicine bottles, and workplace and school surveillance. On a personal level, unwarranted fear causes anxiety, stress, and depression.

Unfortunately, most of us would prefer to worry than spend the time trying to understand and address the causes of our fear. People seek scapegoats to blame and take reactive measures, even if those precautions are a waste of money and energy.
Security upgrades can become a never-ending cycle. Handguns continue to be a growing source of violence, especially among young adults, even though the number of weapons-free environments with metal detectors and body searches is increasing. We have safer cars, safer planes, even better health care, yet 90 percent of Americans feel less safe today than they did in years past. Because people feel they have more to fear, they are also demanding more antidotes. This cycle can manifest itself in the design of buildings, leading to unattractive and fortress-like architecture. Making matters worse, it will be hard to reverse precautions once they are in place. In the narrow debate between a security expert and an architect, it is difficult for the architect to win.

Concluding his analysis, de Becker advocated a thoughtful and rational approach. Security measures are necessary but should be implemented in response to warranted rather than unwarranted fear. Some buildings are more attractive targets and are more vulnerable than others. We should take every reasonable precaution in those cases and resist media-induced panic. That may mean turning off the television, gathering data, and carry out careful risk assessment.

We must also recognize that terrorist ingenuity starts where the security dollar stops. In this context, the government's mandate is to invest in security responsibly—to provide security but accept that risk cannot be eliminated completely. De Becker suggested that American citizens should initiate a new “Contract of Fairness” with their government, according to which we trust government decision-makers will do the best they can to protect us. Becker said we must be willing to accept a certain degree of risk if we wish to preserve the freedom we won in the American Revolution.

“Unwarranted fear is reducing the quality of our lives as we move from fort to fort, as we protect ourselves from a mad bomber who will not come.”

—Gavin de Becker, Balancing Security and Openness Symposium
There are few, if any, easy answers to security concerns. Risks can be hard to quantify and statistics can be readily misused. In this context, framing security challenges generally requires sophisticated analysis and sensitivity to nuances. Moreover, responses can involve technical considerations only fully understood by experts. Further confusion results because perceived risks—especially those sensationalized in the media and for which there is a public outcry for immediate solutions—may not reflect the true source and quality of security problems. To the extent that public policy is driven by public opinion, policy-makers have the difficult task of not letting firm realities be felled by political winds.

The fact that security is most often addressed by bureaucracies, including such Federal entities as the Department of State, the GSA, the Department of Justice, the Marshal’s Service, the FBI, and many other agencies, adds to the complications related to this issue. Coordination among these agencies, each with its own interests, is difficult. Decision-making can be slow and ineffective in dealing with diverse circumstances and competing concerns. The budget process and the allocation of funds among people, training, and technology can be an imprecise and exhausting exercise. Policies can overlap and, at times, contradict one another.

Security is also an arena full of contradictions and ironies. There are rigid rules and there are large exceptions. Even experts disagree about which solutions work and which do not. And there is a growing divide between those who champion openness and those advocate security as their first priority. Architects want to develop sustainable buildings with operable windows and an abundance of natural light, but are faced with security guidelines that make these approaches almost impossible. As Gavin de Becker highlighted, studies show that the most visibly secure schools are those most vandalized. There are people who, at a certain threshold, find security more menacing than the alternative of living with greater risk. There are also individuals who feel under-appreciated and more vulnerable when they find out they may not be threatened. On the one hand, countless experts are developing security measures. On the other, terrorists are becoming equally creative in devising ways to thwart or simply avoid these systems.

“We cannot see security and openness as a tradeoff, with an advance in one meaning a compromise in the other. Our design process must find innovative ways to improve security while projecting American values. We must have a physical presence here and abroad that proclaims our best hopes, not our worst fears.”

_Bonnie R. Cohen, Under Secretary for Management, US Department of State_
Clearly, when it comes to security, there are no universal solutions. We must listen to many voices and explore many options. We must be precautionary but also reasonable. Security is an issue that can atomize society so we must pursue it in ways that do not compromise our democratic values or our sense of community. Ultimately, we must find answers to this difficult challenge one building at a time.

“As an element of foreign policy, our embassies need to be an expression of optimism....Moving to the outskirts of town, building high walls, and investing in elaborate technology is not delivering the appropriate message.”

—Jane Loeffler, Author, The Architecture of Diplomacy

“It used to be that Soviet embassies had the reputation of being walled compounds....Now we are drifting in the same direction with a neo-fortress aesthetic, glitzed-up but still a fortress.”

—Barbara Bodine, US Ambassador to Yemen

It is clear that the high-profile terrorism of the 90s and the Inman report have generated stringent guidelines for embassy security, including significant setbacks, isolated parking, blast resistant walls, and small sealed windows. Unsable walls surround U.S. facilities. Exterior glazing is strictly limited, and the need for large, stand-alone sites has led to the development of embassies in remote locations, far from city centers. These and other design requirements, including a network of intimidating security checkpoints, have resulted in embassies that appear and feel more like fortified bunkers than places for the conduct of international diplomacy of the world’s leading democracy.

Security-driven design makes it harder to fulfill the diplomatic mission of these facilities: one participant commented, “You can’t have diplomacy behind razor-wire.” Moreover, this image contradicts the openness and democracy that constitute this nation’s first and most basic values. Embassies house not only diplomats: they are public buildings that serve both American citizens traveling overseas and foreign publics seeking admission to the United States.
“When it comes to our public buildings, we must re-inoculate ourselves with a commitment to fundamental values—to openness, to engagement, to accessibility.”

—Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge, Massachusetts

A theme reiterated time and time again at the symposium was the principle that fundamental American values should not be sacrificed for the sake of security. Public architecture should be expressive of our American values. It should be dignified as well as welcoming and accessible. It should convey a sense of permanence and the importance of maintaining a civil, open society. Robert Peck, Commissioner of the GSA’s Public Buildings Service, stated that, while he would provide appropriate and effective security, he will not allow his organization to be transformed into the “Fortress Building Service.” What a building expresses is important, and its siting, design, and details should not suggest that we are afraid.

This commitment was not intended to deny the reality of terrorist threats nor to suggest compromised security arrangements. Indeed, at GSA security is a high priority. The agency has devoted more than $1 billion to security since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, more than doubling the normal rate of spending on building security. The focus on values in the security discussion is meant to stimulate the search for creative security solutions, not weaker ones. The goal is to develop strategies that integrate security technology, design, and training with excellence in architecture and landscape design. Public buildings should not only be safe and accessible but also be distinguished by outstanding quality-spaces that unify people with civic pride rather than separate them with walls and barriers. In his remarks, Justice Breyer noted that government must have the public’s trust, and that a dignified and open architecture is one way to earn this respect and confidence.
Over the course of the symposium, several general design principles were articulated as worthy of consideration in the development of security strategies:

- High security public buildings should be personally accessible. The greater the security needs of a government building, the greater the tendency to select sites in remote locations. This consequence of risk aversion contradicts the need to serve the public and represent our nation and its values. Remote structures such as these must have easy access for employees and visitors alike, perhaps via public transportation.

- Public buildings with high security requirements should be designed to be physically accessible. Security setbacks—this is especially true of embassies in an urban context—often make a building appear isolated and disconnected with its environment. One person described the phenomenon as an “elephant in the living room.” To improve physical accessibility and build links with the architectural fabric surrounding a site, buffer zones need to be thoughtfully developed with attractive features such as arcades, porticoes, and landscaping.

- Security elements should not overwhelm perceived accessibility. Barriers and limited glazing can make a building appear fortress-like. Creating effective security while at the same time maintaining a sense of openness and connections with the streetscape should be a primary design objective. Rather than literally designing an “open” structure, this might be achieved by simply responding to the contextual features of surrounding buildings and local architectural styles.

- Security should be designed to meet reasonable rather than rare, catastrophic threats. A balance of risk assessment and innovative design can provide a high degree of security without creating a fortress. Responding to the worst case scenario may enhance safety but at the high price of compromising a commitment to openness and accessibility. Public buildings should never become “prisons.”

“Technology and innovative design can help us move beyond fortress architecture. Embassies should be integrated with their surroundings and culture....Ultimately, embassies are people, personal relationships for the national good. In this context, embassy security cannot be about imprisoning people.”

—Barbara Bodine, US Ambassador to Yemen

To Enhance Design Quality, Several Principles Should Guide the Development of Security Strategies
Following are some of the considerations mentioned in symposium presentations and case studies as essential to the design of physical security:

- **Siting**—This includes setbacks, strategies for vehicular and pedestrian access, landscaping, and the relationship between parking and other building functions.

- **Materials Selection**—Typical issues here include the type and amount of glazing, details related to the design and fabrication of walls, and the development of simultaneously effective and attractive barriers.

- **Structural Design**—In addition to reinforcing walls and other building elements, designers should devise containment strategies to limit the damage caused by a terrorist attack. In the event that part of a facility is destroyed, the structural system must not be subject to progressive collapse.

- **Layout and Interior Design**—There are many ways to address security by carefully arranging building functions and amenities. The following are among the options:
  - Horizontal and vertical adjacencies can be analyzed so high security spaces can be isolated or placed at some distance from public areas.
  - Entrances and checkpoints can be planned as stand-alone structures.
  - Access can be limited to a minimum number of points layered with appropriate screening and security checks.
  - Landscaping can be used to create buffer zones.
  - Natural lighting can be introduced with interior atriums instead of depending entirely on outside windows.

Other general suggestions included protecting power and utility supplies and locating security where it can easily respond to emergencies. Another problem was inadequate funding for site acquisition and development. Finally, participants advocated incremental security features that could be easily upgraded if necessary.

Overall, the goal of both client and designer should be to provide necessary physical security while maintaining standards of architectural excellence that convey both openness and dignity. Isolated, fortress buildings were universally condemned as a solution, as were security features that fundamentally interfere with the functions of and public access to Federal buildings.

"There are no 100 percent solutions.... We must find the balance between competing forces.... We must seek out creative solutions.... We must seek to be both beautiful and safe."

—*J. Carter Brown, Chairman, US Commission of Fine Arts*
Several symposium participants made the point that security requires an investment in people as well as in technology and design. Certain embassies would be well served by a larger contingent of security personnel, others by more careful allotment of existing personnel. Counterintelligence activities are also an effective preventive measure because they monitor and deter terrorists and can often disrupt their plans for attack. Contract security, while often less expensive, is also often less effective because contracted guards do not have the background and experience of guards in the direct employ of Federal agencies. But whatever method is used for defense of public buildings is seriously compromised without a robust training program. Non-security Federal employees should also receive training to augment the eyes and expertise of guards and other specialists.

“We must frame security issues properly. We must study and understand what the risks and threats really are.”
—Robert Campbell, Architecture Critic, The Boston Globe

The threat of terrorism and violence depends on the location and type of facility. Some countries, some cities, and some buildings are more likely targets than others. Certainly embassies and major Federal buildings are particularly vulnerable. But because the risk to different facilities may vary, experts recommended that the security response must be balanced and in proportion to the risk, and that implementation not compromise fundamental American values nor overwhelm the public mission and inherent need for openness in many Federal facilities. Security at the new U.S. Courthouse in Boston, for example, is thoughtfully devised to protect the building and its occupants but still permits the harbor-front foyer and other spaces to be used for a wide variety of community events. The facade maintains the traditional lines of a good urban street, and the riverfront arcade was accommodated by hardening the building’s structure and shifting the location of certain interior functions.
This kind of sensitive security design requires careful planning. The mission and uses of a facility have to be defined, a broad spectrum of users should be surveyed and interviewed, and the context should be analyzed. How good is intelligence and local law enforcement? Is there effective cooperation among agencies involved with security? What security design guidelines are essential, and what are the alternatives related to their implementation? The assessment should be followed by a master plan that articulates the range of vulnerability and reduction options based on facts, not on fear. It should identify interim and permanent security measures as these relate to protecting the various users and perimeters of a building including the street, lobby, and individual interior spaces. It also might suggest security strategies that can be used on an as-needed basis for special events or when threats intensify.

“In addressing security, we must not put solutions ahead of problems. We must carefully assess risk as the pathway to the best security design....We should also be open to out-of-the-box solutions, approaches that resolve security problems with innovative, non-traditional strategies.”

—Robert Peck, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, U.S. General Services Administration

Currently, State Department security design criteria are predominantly prescriptive, and GSA has been developing a similar set of guidelines. Of course, decision-makers could, on a case-by-case basis, waive particular requirements, but when it comes to security, exceptions are rare. While the extensively tested, compliance-based standards expedite the design process they limit architects’ flexibility in searching for new and better solutions.

Fortunately, the symposium became a forum for government leaders to announce a different approach. Bonnie Cohen, Under Secretary of State for Management, and Robert Peck, Commissioner of GSA’s Public Buildings Service, both stated in their summary comments that their
respective agencies would be working to establish performance specifications for security. Rather than mandate specific solutions, these agencies will articulate security objectives and allow project teams to explain how their designs meet those objectives. Moreover, they will ask industry to help test new security solutions. This process will erase a rigidly one-size-fits-all mentality and validate the concept that there are many ways to solve a problem. It encourages innovation in responding to security needs, and it permits managers to address security by combining architectural design, landscape design, technology, staffing, and training in ways that might not otherwise be possible within a framework of explicit security standards.

Several presenters mentioned that more funds would help improve security design in public buildings. The least expensive solutions are Jersey barriers and concrete enclosures, but they are also the approaches that trigger the greatest number of complaints. Subtler, well designed, less obtrusive strategies often come at a higher price, especially as elements are customized to complement a project’s overall design concept. Retrofitting is costly and known to generate numerous unanticipated design problems. While physical security elements and technology are perceived as effective options, significant resources must also be devoted to hiring and training security personnel. And of course, awareness of potential threats and good intelligence can be the best protection against terrorism.

Embassies have special security needs. Their symbolism as well as their many outreach and public activities are poorly understood by the American public. As a consequence, they lack advocates who can bring attention to these important issues, and in general are funded at levels that do not permit the optimum integration of what is a complex mix of symbolic and security functions.

Security Can Be Expensive
Security and public architecture is a complex issue of concern to all Americans, one that benefits from the exchange of diverse perspectives, ideas, and strategies. The symposium was a first step in such an effort. Participants clearly enjoyed the dialogue and felt that it opened up several arenas for future cooperation, including:

• Ongoing and Expanded Discussion—Many public and private entities are addressing the challenge of design and security. The State Department, GSA, and the AIA have pledged to work together to find solutions, and encouraged other governmental entities, professional groups, and private sector specialists to participate in this conversation. At some point, a regularly scheduled forum might be established to facilitate this discussion.

• A Search for Innovative Design Options—Effective security depends on the insights of many disciplines and the blending of technology, design, and personnel. Obviously there are numerous ways to combine these resources. At this juncture, strategies are needed—perhaps competitions and design awards as well as performance specifications—to stimulate the development of creative security solutions and designs that provide the required safety while enhancing the urban environment and improve public access.

• The Development of Legislative Initiatives—Here funding is the priority, both in terms of the size of budgets and the allocation of monies among technology, site acquisition, design and construction, and staffing and training. The government has made significant investments in security, but its work is just beginning. With an inventory of hundreds of buildings that are more than 50 years old, GSA will need to replace or renovate many facilities in the near future. Government agencies must work with private industry to become more persuasive advocates of their security interests on Capitol Hill. A few symposium participants noted that over-reactions to security problems result from the fear of liability. A more balanced implementation of security might emerge if there were laws protecting owners from unreasonable responsibilities.
First Steps

On behalf of the State Department, Bonnie Cohen made a commitment to continue the design and security dialogue with special focus on this year’s embassy design projects. She also announced that the agency is funding a student embassy design competition to promote a fresh look at the security challenge.

Robert Peck made a parallel commitment for GSA to carry the conversation forward. At this juncture, the Public Buildings Service is using the design of two new Federal U.S. Courthouses—one in Springfield, Massachusetts, and the other in Eugene, Oregon—as pilot projects to develop innovative approaches to security. Pilots also will be designated for retrofit commissions and GSA’s First Impressions initiative, which aims to enhance the entrances and lobbies of Federal buildings, already includes integrated, well-designed security as a priority.
The buildings listed below are potential security design case studies. They are simply references. Notes are included to indicate a few points of interest. In-depth documentation and analysis, however, might reveal nuances, details and valuable lessons related to the security strategies used in each facility.

**AT&T Longlines, Northern Virginia**
- Building in park-isolated landscaped site
- Remote parking

**Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Washington, DC**
- Well-designed perimeter protection

**FBI Regional Office, Washington DC**
- Raised plinth
- Masonry walls with limited glazing

**Federal Courthouse, Boston**
- Façade maintains wall along street-good urban design
- Harbor-view arcade viable with hardened structure and shifting of interior functions
- Entry space as gracious separate building-essentially a bollard
- Security/screening hardware part of entry design
- Security strategies permit use of building for community events

**Federal Courthouse, Fresno**
- Entry as glass lobby in garden
- Rest of building-solid and secure

**Federal Courthouse, Santa Ana**
- Entry space as gracious separate building-essentially a bollard

**Merck Complex, New Jersey**
- Building in park-isolated landscaped site
- Remote parking

**New Federal Campus, Oklahoma City**
- No high-rise structures
- No security-related tenants
- Remote parking
- User input essential part of design process, including the development of security strategies
- Respect for urban context-building fills block with just a 50-foot setback
- Hard outside/soft inside-hard materials and limited fenestration on exterior, glazed fenestration on interior courtyard
- Structure designed to resist progressive collapse

**New York Stock Exchange Building, New York City**
- Masonry wall behind glazed façade

**Owings Corning, Toledo, Ohio**
- Building in park-isolated landscaped site
- Remote parking

**Team Disney, Orlando, Florida**
- Building in park-isolated landscaped site
- Remote parking
US Embassy, Ottawa, Canada
- Masonry wall behind glazed façade
- Glazed interior atrium provides light without compromising security
- Low stone walls and fence around perimeter

US Embassy, Berlin, Germany (proposed design)
- Secure yet part of city, strong urban image
- Public space is like porch
- Other spaces more secure

US Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti
- Signage designed to improve security, better visitor control

US Embassy, City of Singapore
- Layers of space-gates and courtyards

US Mission to United Nations, New York City
- Uses Art-in-Architecture funds to explore creative security design
- Security is opportunity to create new image-limited fenestration, building as obelisk, new look for NYC
- Design details intended to engage pedestrian at street level where there is a 40-foot setback

The White House
Washington, DC
- Pennsylvania Avenue-bollards redesigned as poles and chains, shifts image from wall limiting access to edge protecting pedestrian

World Trade Center New York City
- Outer perimeter-limited, controlled parking, planters as bollards, anti-ram barriers, both car and driver identification to enter garage
- Lobbies-Remote surveillance, gated security with IDs for employees, guests, and VIPs
- Tenant security integrated with building security
- Centralized command and control for security

In addition to the specific examples, forum participants noted that security design does not have to be ugly—witness the beauty of Renaissance palazzos, Medieval armor, and the stealth bomber—and identified these general strategies as potential options in security design:
- Fill public spaces in front of buildings with public activity as a security measure
- Promote the use of public transit-minimize parking
- Better integrate entry security/screening devices into lobby design
- Change elevations—raise buildings above street level and protect them with plinths
- Distinguish between secure and non-secure functions and locate each on separate sites
- Turn security walls into propaganda
- Landscape between security walls
**Call for a “National Conversation”**
The Honorable Daniel Patrick Moynihan, U.S. Senate

**What is the Threat?**
Jim Rice, Domestic Terrorism Program, Federal Bureau of Investigation
David G. Carpenter, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security,
U.S. Department of State

**Fear and Public Policy: Anxiety v. Actual Risk**
Gavin de Becker, Award Winning Author

**Balancing Security and Openness on a Day-to-Day Basis**
The Honorable Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge, Massachusetts,
Moderator
The Honorable Barbara K. Bodine, U.S. Ambassador to Yemen
The Honorable Gordon Giffin, U.S. Ambassador to Canada
Douglas Karpiloff, CPP, Security Consultant

**Luncheon Keynote**
The Honorable Stephen Breyer, U.S. Supreme Court

**Public Expectations and the Design Process**
Thom Mayne, AIA, Principal, Morphosis, Moderator
J. Carter Brown, Chairman, U.S. Commission of Fine Arts
Robert Campbell, FAIA, Architecture Critic, The Boston Globe
Barbara Cummings, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Jane C. Loeffer, Author, The Architecture of Diplomacy
Michael Stanton, FAIA, President, The American Institute of Architects

**Design Responses to Security Requirements**
Michael Stanton, FAIA, President, The American Institute of Architects

**The Design Community’s Search for Security Solutions**
David Childs, Partner, Skidmore Owings & Merrill, Moderator
Carol Ross Barney, FAIA, Principal, Ross Barney+Jankowski, Inc.
M. Paul Friedberg, FASLA, Principal, M. Paul Friedberg & Partners
Charles Gwathmey, FAIA, Principal, Gwathmey Siegel & Associates
Frances Halsband, FAIA, Principal, Kliment & Halsband Architects
Carol R. Johnson, FASLA, Principal, Carol R. Johnson Associates
John Ruble, FAIA, Principal, Moore, Ruble Yudell Architects

**Where Do We Go From Here?**
The Honorable Bonnie R. Cohen, Under Secretary for Management,
U.S. Department of State
Robert A. Peck, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service,
U.S. General Services Administration